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Abstract—We propose a technique to assess the vulnerability
of the power system state estimator. We aim at identifying
measurements that have a high potential of being the target of
false data injection attacks. From an adversary’s point of view,
such measurements have to show the following characteristics: i)
being influential on the variable estimates, and ii) corrupting their
measured values is likely to be undetected. Additionally, such
characteristics should not change significantly with the system’s
operating condition. Our technique provides a systematic way of
identifying measurements with such characteristics. We illustrate
our methodology on a 4-bus system and the New England 39-bus
system.
Index Terms—False data injection attacks, power system state
estimation, sensitivity analysis, singular value decomposition
NOMENCLATURE
Sets
N Set of buses indexed by i.
Ni Set of buses connected to bus i.
V Set of buses with voltage magnitude measure-
ments.
P/Q Set of buses with active/reactive power measure-
ments.
Z Set of buses with zero injections.
Pf/Qf Set of branches with active/reactive power flow
measurements.
Parameters
wxi Weighting factor for a measurement at bus i, where
superindex x = V, P,Q, refers to voltage, active
power, and reactive power, respectively.
wxij Weighting factor for a measurement at line ij,
where superindex x = P,Q, refers to active power
and reactive power flows, respectively.
vmi Voltage magnitude measurement at bus i.
Pmi /Q
m
i Active/reactive power injection measurement at
bus i.
Pmij /Q
m
ij Active/reactive power flow measurement from bus
i to j.
Gij/Bij Real/imaginary part of the ijth entry of the admit-
tance matrix.
bshij Shunt susceptance of line ij.
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Variables
vi/θi Voltage magnitude/angle at bus i.
Pi/Qi Active/reactive power injection at bus i.
Pij/Qij Active/reactive power flow ij.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation and aim
One of the key functions of Energy Management Systems
(EMS) is state estimation (SE), which aims at finding the most
likely estimate of the system state (i.e., voltage phasors) given
the network topology and parameters, and a set of real-time
measurements from remote meters and meters [1]. Although
such measurements always contain small errors due to the
accuracy of the corresponding meters, they can also contain
gross errors due to failures in telemetry and/or meters. Gross
errors can also be intentionally injected to deceive the control
decisions of the EMS functions (i.e., security assessment, auto-
matic generation control, and economic dispatch) by exploiting
the vulnerabilities of the telemetry systems to cyber-attacks.
Such cyber-attacks, known as data-integrity attacks, aim at
altering the breaker status and/or measurements while remain-
ing undetected [3], [4]. In particular, we focus on a class of
attacks known as false data injection attacks (FDIAs) where an
adversary compromises a small subset of analog measurements
(e.g., voltage magnitude and angles, power flows, and power
injections) to conceal a particular goal, e.g., deceive system
operator to change generation dispatch, congest transmission
lines, or produce cascading failures [2].
Within the context above, we aim at analyzing the vul-
nerabilities of the state estimation against FDIAs based on
sensitivity analysis. Such vulnerabilities are characterized in
terms of the chance of an attack to significantly influence (if
perturbed) the optimal estimates while remaining undetected.
B. Related work
The theoretical framework for sensitivity analysis in non-
linear optimization used in this paper is stated in [5] and
[6], following the pioneering works of Fiacco [7], Enevoldsen
[8], and Bonnans and Shapiro [9]. Power systems applications
of this sensitivity analysis framework include state estimation
[10] and [11] and pricing [12]. Other engineering applications
include reliability analysis [13], calculus of variations [14] and
civil infrastructure optimal design [15].
Given the characteristics of the nonlinear state estimator
[4], its vulnerability has been studied only in a few works.
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2The vulnerability of the state estimator has been quantified by
the minimum number of sensors that have to be compromised
to stage a stealthy FDIA, which can be formulated as a
minimum cardinality problem [16], [17]. Hug and Giampapa
[18] propose a graph-based algorithm to find the set of
compromised sensors needed to stage an unobservable attack
assuming that the adversary has perfect information of the
system. Rahman et al. [19] extend the work in [18] by
considering incomplete information of the system. Zhao et al.
[20] propose a framework to analyze the vulnerability of the
nonlinear state estimation from the system operator’s point of
view and propose countermeasures. Jin et al. [21] formulate
a framework based on a semi-definite convexification of the
FDIA to find a near-optimal attack strategy and analyze
the attack stealthiness. They provide theoretical guarantees
of sparsity and unobservability. However, this formulation
depends on the adversaries’ objective, which is not necessarily
always available to the system’s operator.
C. Contribution and paper organization
In this paper, we tailor the sensitivity analysis methodology
in [6] to efficiently analyze vulnerabilities in the state esti-
mation problem with respect to FDIAs. Unlike the existing
literature, our methodology does not depend on the adversary’s
objective nor quantify the vulnerability by the minimum
number of sensors needed to be compromised to stage an
unobservable FDIA. From the system’s operator point of view,
we rather focus on the vulnerability based on endogenous
factors of the state estimation and the power grid, such as
the measurement configuration, system topology, and network
parameters. The contributions of this work are threefold:
• To analyze the vulnerabilities in the state estimation prob-
lem with respect to FDIAs based on sensitivity analysis.
We identify such vulnerabilities in terms of the stealthi-
ness and impactfulness characteristics of a FDIA when it
targets a particular measurement. The sensitivity analysis
methodology allows us to compute both characteristics of
all the measurements simultaneously.
• To propose three scores to quantify and rank the vulnera-
bility of each measurement to FDIAs. These scores allow
us to quantify the vulnerabilities of the measurements,
which can help to identify vulnerable areas of the system
and to improve its security.
• To assess the variations of the sensitivities with respect to
different operating conditions based on a singular value
decomposition (SVD) approach. We aim at identifying
whether the vulnerabilities of the state estimation vary
with respect to the operating condition of the system or
they remain almost invariant. The latter case would imply
that the vulnerabilities are mainly dependent on the net-
work topology and its parameters, and the configuration
of the measurements.
Although we illustrate our methodology in the weighted
least squared (WLS) state estimator, such methodology can be
implemented using other estimators (e.g., robust estimators)
as long as they can be stated as a continuous optimization
problem and their solution holds the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) optimality conditions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present the characterization of vulnerable mea-
surements, state the estimation formulation and the analytical
expressions to compute the sensitivities. The method to iden-
tify if such sensitivities change with the system’s operating
conditions is described in Section III. The proposed model is
validated through numerical experiments in two test systems in
Section IV. The main conclusions of the paper are summarized
in Sections V.
II. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we characterize the vulnerability of the mea-
surements against FDIA. Also, we present the state estimation
formulation and derive the analytical expressions to compute
the sensitivities of the objective and estimated variables with
respect to parameters and measurements.
A. Characterizing vulnerable measurements
The goal of a FDIA is to stealthily modify measurements to
introduce gross errors in the variable estimates, which are then
used in other control applications (e.g., security-constrained
optimal power flow and security analysis) [4]. This goal shows
two main characteristics:
1) Stealthiness: Once the solution of the state estimator is
computed, gross errors are detected by comparing the sum of
squared errors with a bad data detection (BDD) flag. In the
case of the WLS estimator, the widely adopted criteria for this
flag comes from a χ2 distribution [1], [22]. Note that if the
state estimator is formulated as an optimization problem, the
sum of squared errors is the value of the objective function.
An adversary aims at modifying measurements without
triggering the BDD flag, which could hinder the successful
staging of the attack. Thus, an attacker would look to corrupt
the measurements that do not change significantly the objective
function when they are perturbed, which means that the
rate of change of the objective function with respect to the
measurement is small.
2) Impactfulness: Besides remaining undetected, an adver-
sary aims at causing a large change in the variable estimates
without significantly modifying the measurement under attack
i.e., the rate of change in the variable estimate as a measure-
ment changes has to be large. Since the state estimation can
be also understood as a nonlinear regression problem, this
characteristic turns out to be the definition of leverage point
in regression analysis [23]. Measurements with high leverage
have two important characteristics: i) they have a significant
influence on the variable estimate when they are perturbed, and
ii) they can be eliminated without losing system observability
unless they are critical measurements [1].
A measurement showing both characteristics is a high-
potential target for cyber-attack as an adversary can stage
an impactful attack while remaining likely undetected. We
note that both characteristics can be described in terms of the
sensitivities of the objective function and the variable estimates
with respect to the measurements. The remainder of this
3section presents a technique to systematically compute both
sensitivities for all the measurements simultaneously using
solely state estimation information.
B. State Estimation Formulation
The weighted least squares (WLS) state estimation can be
formulated as an equality-constrained optimization problem as
follows:
minimize
x
∑
i∈V
wVi (v
m
i − vi)2
+
∑
i∈P
wPi (P
m
i − Pi)2 +
∑
i∈Q
wQi (Q
m
i −Qi)2
+
∑
(i,j)∈Pf
wPij(P
m
ij − Pij)2 +
∑
(i,j)∈Qf
wQij(Q
m
ij −Qij)2 (1a)
subject to
Pi = vi
∑
j∈Ni
vj(Gijcos(θij) +Bijsin(θij)), i ∈ P (1b)
Qi = vi
∑
j∈Ni
vj(Gijsin(θij)−Bijcos(θij)), i ∈ Q (1c)
Pij = vivj(Gijcos(θij) +Bijsin(θij))−Gijv2i , (i, j) ∈ Pf (1d)
Qij = vivj(Gijsin(θij)−Bijcos(θij))
+ v2i (Bij − bshij/2), (i, j) ∈ Qf (1e)
0 = vi
∑
j∈Ni
vj(Gijcos(θij) +Bijsin(θij)), i ∈ Z (1f)
0 = vi
∑
j∈Ni
vj(Gijsin(θij)−Bijcos(θij)), i ∈ Z. (1g)
The objective (1a) is to minimize the weighted sum of
squared errors. Constraints (1b)-(1c) represent the active and
reactive power injections of the buses with available injection
measurements. Constraints (1d)-(1e) represent the active and
reactive power flows of the lines with available flow measure-
ments. Constraints (1f)-(1g) correspond to the zero-injections
(i.e., exact pseudo-measurements).
The above problem can be expressed in compact form as:
minimize
x
J(x,a, z) (2a)
subject to c(x,a) = 0 : λ, (2b)
where J is the sum of squared errors, x ∈ Rn denotes all opti-
mization variables (vi, θi, Pi, Qi, Pij , Qij), z ∈ Rp represents
the measurements (vmi , θ
m
i , P
m
i , Q
m
i , P
m
ij , Q
m
ij ), a ∈ Rq rep-
resents all parameters (wVi , w
P
i , w
Q
i , w
P
ij , w
Q
ij , Gij , Bij , b
sh
ij),
and λ ∈ Rr denotes the Lagrange multiplier vector. Note
that the equality constraints only depend on the optimization
variables and the parameters, not the measurements.
C. Feasible Perturbations and Sensitivity Analysis
Let x∗ be a local optimal solution of Problem (2),
and assume that x∗ is regular i.e., the constraint gradients
∇ck(x∗), k = 1, . . . , r, are linearly independent [24]. Then,
the KKT first-order optimality conditions are [24]
∇xJ(x∗,a, z) +
r∑
k=1
λ∗k∇xck(x∗,a) = 0 (3)
ck(x
∗,a) = 0, k = 1, . . . , r, (4)
where conditions (4) are the primal feasibility conditions.
To determine the sensitivity equations with respect to the
parameters and measurements, we perturb x∗,λ∗, J∗,a, z in
such a way that the KKT conditions still hold [6]. Thus, to
obtain such equations, we differenciate the objective function
(2a) and the optimality conditions (3)-(4) as follows:
[∇xJ(x∗,a, z)]> dx+ [∇aJ(x∗,a, z)]> da+
[∇zJ(x∗,a, z)]> dz − dJ = 0 (5)[
∇xxJ(x∗,a, z) +
r∑
k=1
λ∗k∇xxck(x∗,a)
]
dx+[
∇xaJ(x∗,a, z) +
r∑
k=1
λ∗k∇xack(x∗,a)
]
da+
∇xzJ(x∗,a, z)dz +∇xc(x∗,a)dλ = 0 (6)
[∇xc(x∗,a)]> dx+ [∇ac(x∗,a)]> da = 0 (7)
The above system of equations can be expressed in matrix
form as follows: Jx Ja Jz 0 −1Jxx Jxa Jxz C>x 0
Cx Ca 0 0 0


dx
da
dz
dλ
dJ
 = 0 (8)
where the vectors and submatrices are defined in Appendix A.
Then, equation (5) can be written as:
T
[
dx dλ dJ
]>
= Sada+ Szdz, (9)
where the matrices T , Sa, and Sz are
T =
 Jx 0 −1Jxx C>x 0
Cx 0 0
 ,
S>a = −
[
Ja Jxa Ja
]
,
S>z = −
[
Jz Jxz Jz
]
.
Therefore, we can express (9) as follows:[
dx dλ dJ
]>
= T−1Sada+ T−1Szdz, (10)
which can be solved using the superposition principle by
replacing dz and da by the p-dimensional and q-dimensional
identity matrices, respectively. Then, we obtain the matrices
with all sensitivities with respect to parameters and measure-
ments[
∂x
∂a
∂λ
∂a
]>
= −H−1x Ha,
∂J
∂a
= Ja + Jx
∂x
∂a
(11)[
∂x
∂z
∂λ
∂z
]>
= −H−1x Hz,
∂J
∂z
= Jz + Jx
∂x
∂z
, (12)
where
Hx =
[
Jxx C
>
x
Cx 0
]
, Ha =
[
Jxa
Ca
]
, Hz =
[
Jxz
0
]
.
Clearly, the sensitivities of the objective and the variable
estimates with respect to the measurements, which allow us to
define the vulnerability of each measurement, can be computed
from (12).
4Fig. 1: S-shaped function.
D. Identifying vulnerable measurements
To better visualize the stealthiness and impactfulness of a
measurements z`, we propose three scores to rank the vulner-
ability of a measurement z`: i) S-score(z`), which quantifies
how likely is a FDIA to be undetected, ii) L-score(z`), which
quantifies the influence of a FDIA in the variables estimates,
and iii) V-score(z`), which is a convex combination of the
previous scores. These scores are defined as follows:
S-score(z`) := f
γ−
∣∣∣∣z` ∂J∂z`
∣∣∣∣
max
1≤k≤p
{∣∣∣∣zk ∂J∂zk
∣∣∣∣}
 , (13)
L-score(z`) := g
(∥∥∥∥ ∂x∂z`
∥∥∥∥) , (14)
V-score(z`) := α (S-score(z`)) + (1− α) (L-score(z`)) ,
(15)
where γ > 0, α ∈ [0, 1], and f(·) and g(·) are non-decreasing
functions with range and domain on [0, 1]. It is relevant to note
that to score the leverage of a measurement z`, we consider the
norm of the sensitivities of the variable estimates with respect
to it
∥∥∥ ∂x∂z` ∥∥∥. This allows us to take into account the influence
of such measurement not only on its corresponding variable
estimate (i.e., self-sensitivity), but also its impact on the other
variable estimates.
The proposed scores are closer to 1 when a measurement is
more vulnerable. It is noteworthy that f(·) and g(·) and their
arguments are user-defined. We suggest an S-shaped function
for both scores, such as
f(ξ) =

0, ξ ≤ 0
1
1+( ξ1−ξ )
−β , 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1
1, ξ ≥ 1
where β > 0. Note that smaller values of β render more
conservative scores as the function rapidly downweight the
scores as they distance from 1 as depicted in Fig. 1.
Finally, we note that the procedure to compute the sensitiv-
ities with respect to measurements and the proposed scores is
summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Sensitivity Analysis of State Estimation
Input: Optimal solution (J∗,x∗,λ∗), parameters β > 0, γ >
0, and α ∈ [0, 1], functions f(·) and g(·).
1: Compute. Hx,Hz,Jx,Jz .
2: Compute. ∂J∂z and
∂x
∂z from (12).
3: for ` = 1, . . . , p do
4: S-score(z`)← Evaluate (13).
5: L-score(z`)← Evaluate (14).
6: V-score(z`)← Evaluate (15).
7: end for
Output: Sensitivities
(
∂J
∂z`
, ∂x∂z`
)
, and Scores
(
S-score(z`),
L-score(z`), V-score(z`)
)
, ` = 1, . . . , p.
III. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
In this section, we present a method to identify whether
or no the sensitivities change with the system’s operating
condition.
A. Preprocessing
To determine if the sensitivity vectors show significant
changes with respect to the operating points, we consider t
different operating conditions and compute their corresponding
sensitivities. Then, we arrange these sensitivities in matrices
X ∈ Rt×np and J ∈ Rt×p as follows:
X =

—– x>1 —–
—– x>2 —–
...
—– x>t —–
 , J =

—– J>1 —–
—– J>2 —–
...
—– J>t —–
 , (16)
where xk := vec
(
∂x
∂z
)
and Jk := ∂J∂z are the sensitivities
at a given operating condition k. Each column of X and
J correspond to a particular sensitivity for all the operating
conditions.
Note that in (16) we assume that every sensitivity vector xk
and Jk has the same dimension i.e., the system topology and
measurement configuration remain unaltered, which might not
be always true. If the dimensions of the sensitivity vectors are
different, then it is necessary to keep only the sensitivities that
are common for all the operating conditions.
Singular value decomposition (SVD) allow us to deter-
mine if such sensitivities significantly vary depending on
the different operating points. Before computing the SVD of
both matrices, it is necessary to subtract the mean of each
column (i.e., each column has zero-mean). We compute the
row vectors containing the means of every column as
x¯ =
1
t
t∑
k=1
xk, j¯ =
1
t
t∑
k=1
Jk, (17)
where x¯ ∈ R1×np and j¯ ∈ R1×p. Then, we can compute the
elements of the centered matrices as follows:
X˜ = X − 1p · x¯, J˜ = J − 1p · j¯, (18)
where 1p is the t-dimensional all-ones column vector, and X˜
and J˜ are the mean-centered sensitivity matrices.
5B. Singular Value Decomposition
The SVD allows us to determine if the sensitivities are
significantly affected by the different operating points. We
compute the SVD of both standardized matrices as follows:
X˜ = UΣV > =
min{t,np}∑
i=1
σiuiv
>
i , (19)
J˜ = UˆΣˆVˆ
>
=
min{t,p}∑
i=1
σˆiuˆivˆ
>
i , (20)
where the diagonal elements of Σ and Σˆ are the singular
values of X˜ and J˜ , respectively, and they are ordered from
largest to smallest.
If the largest singular values are significantly larger than
the smallest ones, we can say that the sensitivities are not
strongly dependent on the system’s operating condition. Such
characteristic is key for a cyber-attack because it means that
the sensitivities depend on factors that do not change signif-
icantly over time (e.g., system’s topology, lines’ parameters,
and measurements’ locations and precisions). Thus, it allows
the adversary to identify the target measurements off-line,
and to stage an attack on one of these measurements without
knowing other measurements.
To quantify the proportion of the variance of the mean-
centered sensitivity matrices X˜ and J˜ that is captured by their
first r singular values, we define the cumulative energy (CE)
as follows:
CE(X˜; r) :=
r∑
i=1
σi
min{t,np}∑
i=1
σi
, CE(J˜ ; r) :=
r∑
i=1
σˆi
min{t,p}∑
i=1
σˆi
(21)
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
In this section, two case studies are analyzed considering
a 4-bus system and the New England 39-bus system. The
weights of the voltage measurements are assumed to be
wV = 1e4 whereas the remaining measurements have weights
w = 2.5e3. We consider 24 operating conditions, which are
generated by multiplying all the demands by the scale factors,
and that the topology of the systems remains unchanged. Also,
we set α = 0.3 and β = 1 and β = 1.5 for the S-score and
L-score, respectively.
A. 4-bus system
The 4-bus system and its measurement configuration are
depicted in Fig. 2. The presented measurement configuration
provides a redundancy ratio of 1.71 where Pm2 and Q
m
2 are
zero-injection measurements.
The sensitivity of the objective function with respect to
the measurements is depicted in Fig. 3. We note that the
magnitude of the sensitivities remains almost invariant with the
operating conditions. Pm1 is the measurement with the largest
normalized sensitivity
(∣∣∣zk ∂J∂z` ∣∣∣ /maxk {∣∣∣zk ∂J∂zk ∣∣∣}
)
, thus the
less vulnerable in terms of stealthiness as an FDIA against
Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3
Bus 4
∼
vm1 v
m
2
Pm1 P
m
2 P
m
3Q
m
1 Q
m
2 Q
m
3
Pm14 ↓ ← Pm32
Pm34 ↓ ⇓ Qm34
Voltage
Active power injection
Reactive power injection
−→ Active power flow
=⇒ Reactive power flow
Fig. 2: 4-bus system - One-line diagram and measurement
location (Pm2 and Q
m
2 are zero-injection measurements).
Fig. 3: 4-bus system - Normalized sensitivity of the objective
with respect to measurements. The x-axis represents the 24
operating conditions. A darker color means that the measure-
ment is more likely to be a target of undetected FDIAs.
it is unlikely to remain undetected. Conversely, Qm3 is the
measurement with the smallest sensitivity followed by Qm34,
Qm1 and P
m
32 , respectively.
Likewise, the sensitivity of the variable estimates with
respect to the measurements when at maximum demand is
depicted in Fig. 4. The measurements with the highest self-
sensitivities are Qm1 , Q
m
3 , P
m
3 and P
m
1 , respectively, which
are the most vulnerable ones in terms of impactfulness.
Specifically, Qm1 shows the largest self-sensitivity. v
m
1 and v
m
2
show the largest impact on the other variable estimates (v3
and v4). A FDIA compromising these measurements will have
a significant impact on the corresponding variable estimates.
Furthermore, it is convenient to analyze the dependence of the
variable estimates with respect to each measurement. vm1 and
vm2 show important influence on the estimates of v3 and v4.
Similarly, Pm1 and Q
m
3 (resp. P
m
14 and Q
m
34 have a significant
influence on the variable estimates of P14 and Q34 (resp. P1
and Q3), respectively.
Table I provides the three proposed scores of each measure-
ment at a scale factor equal to 1. Qm1 is the most vulnerable
measurement followed by Qm3 . All these measurements are
vulnerable due to the lack of redundancy of reactive power
6Fig. 4: 4-bus system - Sensitivity of estimated variables with
respect to measurements (Scale factor = 1). The sensitivities
with larger absolute value are depicted with darker colors. A
darker color means that the measurement is more likely to be
a target of impactful FDIAs.
Fig. 5: 4-bus system - (Left) Singular values σr. (Right)
Cumulative energy in the first r singular values.
measurements near buses 1 and 3. These measurements exhibit
the highest potential to be targeted for cyber-attacks. The best
chance of staging a stealthy and impactful FDIA if corrupting
any of these two measurements.
Fig. 5 shows that the leading singular value of X˜ and J˜
account for almost 95% and 96% of their variance. Thus,
both sensitivity vectors are almost invariant to the different
operating points, which lead us to the conclusion that the
vulnerabilities are mainly dependent on the network topology
and its parameters, and the measurements’ configuration.
B. New England 39-bus system
We consider that the New England 39-bus system has the
following measurements: all the voltage magnitudes, active
and reactive power injections at all generating buses, and the
active and reactive power flows at the sending ends of all lines.
The system data can be retrieved from MATPOWER [25].
The sensitivities of the estimated variables with respect
to measurements are depicted in Fig. 6. The voltage mea-
surements are not leverage points since their self-sensitivities
are small. Conversely, the majority of the active and reactive
TABLE I: 4-bus system - Vulnerability Scores
Meas. S-score L-score V-score
vm1 0.4037 1.0000 0.8211
vm2 0.3506 1.0000 0.8052
Pm1 0.0334 0.8692 0.6184
Pm3 0.5092 0.8794 0.7683
Qm1 0.7913 0.9989 0.9366
Qm3 0.8927 0.9188 0.9109
Pm14 0.1974 0.6919 0.5436
Pm32 0.6747 0.5112 0.5603
Pm34 0.5331 0.2678 0.3474
Qm34 0.8725 0.6076 0.6871
Fig. 6: New England 39-bus system - Sensitivity of estimated
variables with respect to measurements (Scale factor = 1).
power flow and injection variables have high sensitivity with
respect to their corresponding measurements.
Additionally, Fig. 7 depicts the vulnerability scores of all
the measurements. An important number of measurements
show an S-score near 1, which makes them attractive to
the adversary from the stealthiness point of view. The L-
score does not show the same distribution; however, there are
48 measurements whose L-score is greater than 0.8. Finally,
22 active and reactive power flow measurements have a V-
score greater than 0.95. These results show that the lack of
redundancy of active and reactive power measurements is not
localized in a certain area of the system, which may be due
to the low redundancy ratio.
We also provide the number of vulnerable measurements as
a function of different threshold values in Fig. 8. We consider
that a measurement z` is vulnerable if its V-score(z`) ≥
threshold. A smaller threshold implies higher conservativeness
as it results in declaring a larger number of measurements as
vulnerable. Table II lists the ten most critical measurements,
V-score ≥ 0.9836, in descending order of their V-score.
Clearly, these measurements are potential targets of FDIAs
as their scores are close to 1, which means that if they
are perturbed, they significantly influence their corresponding
variable estimates.
The leading singular values of X˜ and J˜ , presented in
Table III, capture around 65% and 80% of their variance,
7Fig. 7: New England 39-bus system - Vulnerability scores.
Fig. 8: New England 39-bus system - Vulnerable measure-
ments. A measurement z` is considered vulnerable if its
V-score(z`) ≥ threshold.
respectively. In the case of J˜ , its first three singular values
account for more than 97% of its variance. On the other hand,
the four leading singular values of X˜ capture around 90% of
its variance. These results show the low-rank characteristic of
both matrices.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a technique based on sensitivity analy-
sis to identify measurements with a high potential of being the
target of false data injection attacks. We characterize the vul-
nerability of each measurement as a function of their potential
to impact the variable estimates and to remain stealthy.
In our numerical studies, we demonstrate that there is a sub-
set of measurements that show both characteristics, thus being
the most vulnerable to FDIAs. Furthermore, we numerically
demonstrate that such vulnerabilities remain almost invariant
to the system’s operating condition, which implies that they are
TABLE II: 39-bus system - Vulnerability Scores
Meas. S-score L-score V-score
Pm19−20 0.999176 1 0.999753
Qm19−20 0.997233 0.999953 0.999137
Qm5−6 0.998304 0.996979 0.997377
Qm22−23 0.996568 0.995312 0.995689
Qm10−13 0.992317 0.997078 0.995649
Qm17−18 0.996833 0.992793 0.994005
Qm16−19 0.969506 0.999661 0.990615
Qm6−11 0.99855 0.980853 0.986162
Qm10−11 0.960126 0.997099 0.986007
Pm16−19 0.945391 1 0.983617
TABLE III: New England 39-bus system - SVD results
r
Singular values, σr Cumulative energy
J X J X
1 304.2029 3.4085 0.8010 0.6525
2 54.4586 1.2666 0.9443 0.8950
3 14.2156 0.4722 0.9818 0.9854
4 4.6080 0.0643 0.9939 0.9977
5 2.2604 0.0105 0.9999 0.9997
6 0.0398 0.0011 1.000 0.9999
mainly dependent on the network topology and its parameters,
and the measurements’ configuration.
The proposed technique can be used to identify the most
vulnerable measurements. Additionally, identifying such mea-
surements can be used to secure their telemetry or to allocate
new measurements to improve the redundancy over specific
areas of the system.
8APPENDIX A
The auxiliary submatrices and vectors in (8) necessary for
computing the sensitivities are defined below:
Jx(1×n) = [∇xJ(x∗,a, z)]> , (22)
Ja(1×q) = [∇aJ(x∗,a, z)]> , (23)
Jz(1×p) = [∇zJ(x∗,a, z)]> , (24)
Jxx(n×n) = ∇xxJ(x∗,a, z) +
r∑
k=1
λ∗k∇xxck(x∗,a), (25)
Jxa(n×q) = ∇xaJ(x∗,a, z) +
r∑
k=1
λ∗k∇xack(x∗,a), (26)
Jxz(n×p) = ∇xzJ(x∗,a, z)dz, (27)
Cx(r×n) = [∇xc(x∗,a)]> , (28)
Ca(r×q) = [∇ac(x∗,a)]> . (29)
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